Challenge the Assumptions Behind the Program
Large government technology programs develop enormous momentum. Contracts are awarded, vendors are selected, budgets are committed, and the underlying requirements begin to feel inevitable. But scale does not make an assumption correct. Sometimes the most important contribution is simply being willing to ask whether the program is solving the problem in the right way.
During my work with the Department of Defense, I led an effort that challenged one of those assumptions. The result was a more practical communications system for the U.S. Army and savings exceeding $1 billion.
A $37,000 Radio Was Not the Only Answer
In the early 2000s, the Department of Defense was developing the Joint Tactical Radio System, or JTRS, an ambitious family of software-defined radios intended to improve interoperability across the military services. One part of the program envisioned providing every dismounted Army soldier with a radio costing approximately $37,000. Equipping the force at that price would have required an investment approaching $20 billion.
The JTRS Program Office maintained that no lower-cost alternative could meet Army requirements. Then an Assistant Secretary of the Army asked a different question: could a soldier radio built around commercial technology deliver the necessary capability for roughly $1,000? The question was simple, but answering it required credible analysis that Army leadership and the acquisition community would trust.
Independent Analysis Changed the Outcome
Our firm was selected to lead a special research effort managed through DARPA. We assembled an international team of communications experts from the United States, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Italy, and India, and spent nine months examining the assumptions behind the existing design.
Instead of beginning with traditional military development practices, we started with commercially available technology and asked what soldiers actually needed. Our team concluded that a commercial-centric radio architecture could be built with a bill of materials of approximately $250 and a finished cost near $1,000.
The findings were controversial because they challenged the prevailing view that the existing program had already exhausted the available alternatives. Additional independent reviews were commissioned, and they reached essentially the same conclusion. The Army ultimately developed the Rifleman Radio, which entered service at approximately $2,800 rather than $37,000.
Within two years, the Army had saved more than $1 billion while fielding communications capability to many more soldiers.
The Best Questions Can Change a Program
The experience reinforced a lesson I have seen repeatedly in both government and business: large programs are often shaped as much by assumptions, incentives, and institutional habits as by engineering.
A well-supported question can be more valuable than an expensive answer.
When requirements, acquisition strategies, or cost assumptions go unchallenged, organizations can become locked into unnecessarily complex and expensive solutions. Independent analysis creates value by testing those assumptions before they become permanent.
Why This Matters in Litigation
Disputes involving government technology programs often turn on questions that go well beyond technical performance. Were the requirements reasonable? Were lower-cost alternatives adequately evaluated? Did decision makers receive complete information? Were acquisition and procurement choices commercially reasonable?
Having worked directly with Army leadership, DARPA, acquisition officials, program offices, and international engineering teams, I understand how assumptions become embedded in major programs and how they influence technical decisions, contract performance, cost, and risk. That perspective can be critical when attorneys must explain complex government technology decisions to judges, juries, arbitrators, and opposing counsel.
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